The Deradicalization Dilemma: Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Challenge

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The Nigerian Defence Headquarters’ recent decision to rehabilitate 800 surrendered Boko Haram fighters has ignited intense debate over the effectiveness and risks of deradicalization programs. Critics, including Punch, argue that reintegrating former terrorists without due judicial process undermines justice, security, and victim support. However, global research—such as the works of Dr. Angel Rabasa and case studies from the United Kingdom—suggests that deradicalization, when properly structured, is a critical component of counterterrorism.

The key issue is not whether deradicalization works, but how it is implemented. Failures in the U.K., particularly the cases of Usman Khan and Sudesh Amman, reveal the dangers of releasing individuals prematurely under weak rehabilitation models, which can lead to deadly consequences. Meanwhile, research by Douglas Weeks underscores that while full deradicalization remains difficult, structured disengagement strategies can significantly reduce terrorist recidivism. To prevent program failures, Nigeria must adopt a more structured, context-specific approach that prioritizes justice, disengagement, long-term post-release monitoring, and—crucially—support for victims and affected communities.

Lessons from the U.K.: What Nigeria Must Consider

1. The Risks of Premature Release Without Proper Supervision

The U.K. experience demonstrates that without adequate supervision, released militants can relapse into extremism.

• Usman Khan, once considered a model rehabilitation case, attacked his mentors at a prison education event in London in 2019.
• Sudesh Amman, released early despite being flagged as high-risk, launched an attack in London just days later.
• Following these incidents, the U.K. ended early release for terrorism offenders and imposed stricter post-release monitoring.

  

Nigeria must learn from these failures by ensuring that rehabilitated individuals do not return to violence due to poor oversight.

2. Low Recidivism Rates vs. Successful Deradicalization

According to Douglas Weeks, while terrorist offenders generally have lower recidivism rates compared to other criminals, this does not necessarily indicate successful deradicalization.

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• Instead, most offenders show desistence—meaning they do not re-offend but may still hold radical beliefs.
• Deradicalization is difficult, but mentorship and intervention programs have worked in several cases.
• The U.K. found that credible mentors—those who gain the trust of former extremists—are key to long-term disengagement.

Nigeria should focus on disengagement rather than ideological transformation, ensuring that former militants are removed from extremist networks and given alternative pathways.

3. The Role of Structured Mentoring and Community Reintegration

One of the biggest challenges in deradicalization programs is gaining the trust of former extremists.

• In the U.K., The Unity Initiative (TUI), a leading rehabilitation group, severed ties with the government due to restrictive, one-size-fits-all policies that ignored individual needs.
• Usman Khan had sought deradicalization assistance years before his attack, but delays in accessing support and a lack of sustained mentorship failed him.

Nigeria’s program must not make the same mistake. Rehabilitation should be holistic and mentor-driven, providing not only psychological and ideological counseling but also practical support, including:

• Education and vocational training
• Community engagement
• Continuous psychological support

4. Preventing Prison Radicalization

The U.K.’s Belmarsh Prison case demonstrated that mixing high-risk extremists with general prison populations can lead to further radicalization.

• In Nigeria, many Boko Haram fighters may radicalize others in detention, worsening the security threat.
• The solution? Separate high-risk individuals from those who were coerced into joining terror groups and implement targeted disengagement efforts.

  

Building a Smarter Deradicalization Strategy for Nigeria

To enhance security while ensuring long-term stability, Nigeria’s government should adopt the following measures:

Ensure Legal Accountability

• Prosecution must precede reintegration—militants should not be rehabilitated without first facing justice for their crimes.
• Specialized counterterrorism courts should efficiently handle cases, balancing punishment and rehabilitation.

Strengthen Post-Release Supervision

• Continuous counseling, job training, and community engagement should be mandatory for released militants.
• Surveillance and monitoring systems should track former fighters and intervene at early signs of relapse.

Prioritize Victim Support and Community Rebuilding

• Funds allocated for deradicalization must be matched or exceeded by funds for victims.
• Compensation programs, trauma counseling, and community reconciliation should be central to the counterterrorism strategy.

Adopt a Human-Centered Approach to Disengagement

• Instead of coercing ideological change, Nigeria should create social and economic incentives for reintegration.
• Programs should focus on education, mentorship, and vocational training to build new social identities.

Separate High-Risk from Low-Risk Individuals

• Prisons must be restructured to prevent radical networks from forming.
• High-risk detainees should be separated from those who were coerced into Boko Haram.

Nigeria’s current deradicalization approach is flawed but fixable. The cases of Usman Khan and Sudesh Amman illustrate that deradicalization without strict oversight can lead to devastating consequences. However, imprisoning extremists without rehabilitation does not work either—it may even fuel further radicalization.

The solution lies in balancing security, justice, and rehabilitation:

Prosecution before reintegration
Structured post-release supervision
Victim-centered policies
Human-centered disengagement strategies

By learning from both the successes and failures of global counterterrorism efforts—including insights from Douglas Weeks’ research on the limits and possibilities of deradicalization—Nigeria can develop a smarter, safer, and more just deradicalization program—one that prioritizes security without sacrificing long-term peace.

This editorial is written in response to Punch Newspaper’s recent editorial, “Terrorists Don’t Repent,” which argues that deradicalization is an exercise in futility. While skepticism about the effectiveness of these programs is understandable, dismissing deradicalization entirely ignores the complexities of disengagement, rehabilitation, and the long-term security risks posed by simply keeping extremists locked away without efforts to reintegrate them into society. The challenge is not whether terrorists can repent but whether Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy can be smart enough to prevent them from returning to violence. A structured, evidence-based approach—not blanket rejections—will be the key to success.