Greed, Grievance, and the Future of Civil Conflict

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The causes of civil conflict have long been contested terrain between economic and political explanations. In their influential 2004 article, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler challenged conventional wisdom by arguing that civil wars are more likely to be driven by the opportunity for rebellion than by deep-seated grievances. Their analysis, based on a broad cross-national dataset, found that variables such as low income, slow economic growth, and primary commodity dependence are stronger predictors of conflict than measures of inequality or political repression. This opportunity-based framework has profound implications for development policy and conflict prevention—and it deserves renewed attention in today’s world. Nowhere is this more urgently relevant than in Nigeria, where conflict continues to erupt despite repeated interventions.

At the heart of Collier and Hoeffler’s thesis is the idea that rebellion, much like crime, occurs when it becomes financially viable. The authors liken rebel groups to entrepreneurs exploiting “lootable” resources—such as diamonds, oil, or foreign diaspora remittances—to fund insurgencies. Their findings show that countries, where primary commodities account for roughly 30% of GDP, are at peak risk for civil war, particularly if they have experienced past conflict. These factors lower the cost of rebellion, creating fertile ground for violence regardless of how justified or unjustified the grievances may be. In Nigeria, where oil accounts for more than 80% of government revenue, this risk becomes acutely visible in both regional and national security threats.

This does not mean that grievances are irrelevant. Collier and Hoeffler acknowledge that perceived grievances—whether due to inequality, repression, or ethnic dominance—can still serve as powerful motivators. However, they argue that such grievances only matter when the structural conditions allow rebellion to take root. For example, their data shows that objective measures of political exclusion or income inequality have little statistical impact once economic opportunities for rebellion are accounted for. In Nigeria, this insight helps explain why regions like the Northeast and the Niger Delta remain conflict-prone even as grievances persist across the entire country.

For policymakers, these findings present both a warning and a roadmap. Aid should be directed not just toward grievance alleviation, such as building inclusive institutions, but also toward reducing the economic feasibility of conflict. Investments in education, particularly male secondary education, are shown to reduce the risk of war by increasing opportunity costs for potential recruits. Likewise, diversifying economies away from dependence on primary commodities can limit rebel financing. In Nigeria, where male youth unemployment and low education rates are persistent challenges, addressing these structural issues could significantly reduce the appeal of armed movements. In regions like Kaduna, Borno, and Bayelsa, tailored strategies that mix education investment with inclusive governance could shift the tide.

Nigeria exemplifies the real-world application of these insights. Despite deep grievances stemming from ethnic and regional divisions, political exclusion, and inequality, the recurrence of violent conflict—especially in regions like the Niger Delta and the Northeast—has often followed patterns of economic opportunity for rebellion. Nigeria’s oil wealth has both funded insurgency and weakened state capacity through corruption and rent-seeking. Moreover, diaspora funding and uneven economic development have sustained grievances and lowered the costs of rebellion. To reverse these trends, Nigeria must adopt an integrated approach that addresses both the root causes and the enablers of civil conflict.

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Today, as civil wars simmer from the Sahel to Southeast Asia, the “greed versus grievance” debate remains salient. Collier and Hoeffler’s integrated model reminds us that prevention must address both the motivations and mechanics of conflict. In a world where grievances abound but only some places descend into war, understanding how to cut off the oxygen of rebellion—its financing, its manpower, and its myths—could be the key to lasting peace. Nigeria, with its complex mosaic of opportunity and grievance, stands as both a cautionary tale and a hopeful test case for this approach. If Nigeria succeeds, it could offer a model for conflict prevention across much of the developing world.